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Throughout the United States, the Interstate Highway 
System is deteriorating. Responding to the failure of the 
most expensive and expansive public infrastructure ever 
built is a challenge that municipalities, states, and the 
federal government must all face. In Syracuse, NY, the 
decline of Interstate 81 (I-81) is compounded by an elevated 
portion that extends 1.4 miles through the city’s downtown. 
Referred to as an “elevated viaduct”, this portion is actually 
a series of 124 linked bridges that thread through the city 
center.1 For 60% of the bridges that make up the viaduct, 
aspects such as lane width, carrying capacity, and roadway 
alignments do not meet current bridge standards, resulting 
in a classification as “functionally obsolete”.2
Currently, the viaduct runs between East Syracuse and 
Syracuse University, and separates Syracuse University 
from downtown.  There are two stories to tell regarding 
the viaduct. The first is the historical account of how this 
stretch of highway came to be located where it is, why it 
is elevated, and who the players were in those decisions. 
The second is what the future holds for both the highway 
and for Syracuse. The history of the viaduct in Syracuse is 
tightly interwoven with national and state transportation 
policies and slum clearance projects, later called “urban 
renewal.” This paper will discuss how Syracuse’s strict 
fiscally conservative position empowered state and federal 
engineers to impose their own plans on the city, giving little 
consideration to public opinion or social justice. The physical 
and economic damage caused by the viaduct, along with a 
deep mistrust of the Syracuse Metropolitan Transportation 
Council and state engineers, has led to a painstakingly slow 
process of public engagement and trust-building today. This 
paper will focus primarily on early transportation planning 
in Syracuse, including the construction of the viaduct. The 
latter part of the paper will examine how various actors in 
the city are attempting to build a participatory approach to 
1  Onondaga Citizens’ League 2009, 17 
2  Syracuse Metropolitan Transportation Council 2011, 4
cope with the structure’s deterioration.  
Transportation infrastructure has defined Syracuse. 
Fortuitously located along major east-west and north-south 
corridors in Central New York, Syracuse has hosted trade 
and travelers via canals, railroads, and highways. The first 
of these infrastructures, the Erie Canal, opened in 1825, the 
same year that Syracuse incorporated as a city.3 The Erie 
Canal passed through the center of downtown Syracuse 
and single-handedly drove the downtown development and 
city layout that remains in 2012. Figure 1 shows Syracuse’s 
downtown at the height of the Canal’s use. Originally, 
Syracuse and her surrounding environs were known for 
their salt mines and swamps, but with the arrival of the 
canal system, Syracuse began to rapidly expand into a major 
commercial center for trade from Chicago to New York. In 
addition to the Erie Canal, a series of feeder canals threaded 
through Syracuse on the way to Watertown, Binghamton, 
and throughout western New York. The population of 
Syracuse expanded rapidly in the late 19th century, rising 
from 22,000 to 108,000 between 1850 and 1900.4 In 1910, 
when the New York Central Railroad system replaced the 
Erie Canal, it laid the groundwork for Syracuse to remain 
a focal point in travel and trade throughout the eastern 
United States. 
EARLY HIGHWAY PLANNING 
Throughout the early 20th century, downtown Syracuse 
remained a hub for regional economic activity. As 
transportation methods shifted again ‒ from railroads to 
automobiles ‒ the city began grappling with how to plan 
for and build new infrastructure systems.  Nationwide, 
between 1930 and 1940 the number of people riding 
mass transit declined by nearly 20%, while car ownership 
increased by 30%.5 Locally, in 1921 Onondaga County 
had 25,700 registered vehicles. By 1941 the number 
3  Layden 2001
4  Syracuse Herald 1897
5  Scott 1969, 362
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of registered vehicles jumped to 88,400.6 In the 1940s, 
transportation planning in Syracuse was an unlikely mix 
of local progressive interest and private sponsorship. In 
1940, Fortune Magazine nominated Syracuse as a “model 
mid-size city” and provided the framework and funding for 
Syracuse’s first transportation plan. This plan, which was 
published in the Syracuse Post War Traffic Report (SPWTR), 
outlined the development of two major transportation 
arteries: an east-west artery following the old Erie Canal, 
now called NY Highway 5, and a north-south artery following 
NY Highway 11. These two roads converged in downtown 
Syracuse as Erie Boulevard and Salina Street. This plan also 
included a beltway and proposed exchanges to integrate the 
downtown portions of the streets to through-highways and 
Interstate 90.7 The SPWTR sought to alleviate congestion in 
downtown Syracuse, while improving the city’s connection 
to the trade routes it sat astride, allowing access to New 
6  Cohn 1978, 19
7  Cohn, Page 29 (Traffic Committee, Traffic, pg. 26, 43)
York City, Buffalo, and Watertown. During WWII, 85% of 
traffic on New York highways traveled to or from New York 
City, and it was natural for Syracuse to want to capitalize 
on this economic trade route.8  Figure 2 shows how the 
proposed Highway 11 and Highway 5 would intersect with 
the proposed Interstate 90. 
The second goal of the SPWTR was to help downtown 
Syracuse combat a new challenge: gridlock. As in many 
places, city leaders sought to reduce traffic pressure in 
downtown by creating through-highways that would move 
traffic into and out of the city more smoothly. Early in the 
development of the SPWTR, a city engineer named Nelson 
Pitts expressed his concern that focusing too much on 
highway construction could lead to people traveling out of 
the downtown, rather than into it.9  The Syracuse Onondaga 
Post-War Planning Council (SOWPC) finally published the 
8  Cohn, Page 31 (Traffic Committee, Traffic, pg. 26, 43)
9  DiMento 2009, 148
Figure 1: The Erie Canal at Salina Street, circa. 1900 (Library of Congress) Now the site of Clinton Square, once speculated to be the perfect 
site for a surface parking lot to serve local businesses. Source: Library of Congress
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SPWTR in 1945. This final plan offered a visually attractive 
option, but the engineering science behind the plan was 
never articulated. In this early plan, all of the highways would 
be at-grade, with generous boulevards to ease pedestrians’ 
passage through the city. Figure 3 shows a sample of this 
early highway vision. Unfortunately, the proposal excluded 
specific explanations of how the through-boulevards would 
connect to other city arteries or to Interstate 90.10 
FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS AND STATE 
INTERVENTION
The Syracuse city government did not embrace the Post-War 
Traffic Plan. In 1943, Mayor Thomas Edward Kennedy stated 
that the city would only finance post-war planning programs 
on a pay-as-you-go basis. He and fellow conservatives on 
the City Commission refused to accept any plans that led 
to deficit spending. This staunch anti-deficit, anti-bond 
position carried through to his successor, Mayor Frank 
Costello. Although the Syracuse city government widely 
acknowledged downtown traffic congestion as a leading 
10  Cohn 1978, 30A
problem, there was little hope for a major infrastructure 
project to gain momentum.
Fortunately for Syracuse, it was just ahead of its time in 
traffic planning. Beginning in 1945, the State of New York 
and the federal government took a renewed interest in 
inter-city highway systems and in urban highway systems. 
In New York, the passage of the Urban Arterial Laws 
galvanized investment in urban highway planning. The 
first step of New York State’s Expressway Program was for 
every city in the state with over 5,000 people to create a 
master transportation plan. New York State and the local 
municipality would then share the implementation cost of 
the final plans in each city. 11 The newly deployed New York 
State Department of Arterial Route Planning capitalized 
on the work of SOPWPC to inform the plan for Syracuse. 
Many similarities existed between the two agencies’ plans. 
Each featured the east-west and north-south development 
of Route 11 (Salina Street) and Route 5 (Erie Boulevard) 
with a center-city circulation nucleus. The most prominent 
difference between the two plans was that the State’s 
11  Tallamy 1947, 35
Figure 2: Vision of the development of 
traffic facilities, Syracuse urban area, 
primary and secondary routes 
Source: Syracuse–Onondaga County 
Post-War Planning Council, “Postwar 
Perspective: A Report to the People of 
the City of Syracuse and the County 
of Onondaga, 1944” (draft, Sergei 
Grimm), 66.
65
Figure 3. The Post-War Traffic Report featured center lanes for 
through traffic and outside separate lanes for local traffic.
Source: Jerome Allan Cohn, “Urban Background to the 
Interstate Highway Program: The Planning and Politics of 
Highways in Syracuse: 1944–1960” (PhD thesis, Syracuse 
University, 1978).30A
plan eliminated the SOPWPC’s proposed beltway, which 
was more consistent with the State’s other transportation 
plans. With these two plans developed, financing the 
infrastructure project became the last hurdle for Syracuse. 
Despite the willingness of New York State to provide 50% of 
the funding, local politicians were still unwilling to put the 
city into any debt for the project. Over the 10-year period 
from 1946 to 1956 the paralysis surrounding Syracuse’s 
traffic troubles continued. While the majority of city 
stakeholders supported the construction of new highway 
systems, no party was inclined to push the city into debt in 
order to fulfill these wishes. 
 
FUNDING THE HIGHWAY AND THE RISE OF 
THE VIADUCT
In 1956, an answer to the funding question arrived. That 
year, Congress passed the Federal Aid Highway Act, the 
largest government infrastructure program in US history. 
Armed with this new source of funding, New York State 
engineers reopened the case for downtown arterial highway 
development in Syracuse. These late-stage plans brought 
a major change: a key element of the state engineers’ 
proposal was a raised viaduct that would cut through 
southeast Syracuse to downtown. 
The viaduct proposal infuriated local business owners 
and residents. Downtown business owners worried that 
the viaduct would cut downtown off from its customers. 
Residents feared that the viaduct would not only divide 
their neighborhood, but also create a dead zone for 
development under the route of the highway.  Syracuse 
was not the only city where local sentiment conflicted 
with state and national technocrats: across America, local 
organizers motivated city residents to fight against the 
elevated highways and found at least limited successes. 
Unfortunately, as one historian noted, “The people of 
New York entered into a devil’s bargain: to secure a system 
closed to localism and patronage, they bought into a system 
closed to all but highway engineers.”12 The State touted 
the elevated highway as the only option for the downtown 
arterial, and for fear of losing the state funds, city leaders 
accepted the viaduct with little argument. The federal 
highway funds and engineering recommendations were 
not the only factors behind the viaduct. City management 
and willful disenfranchisement contributed to the selection 
of the viaduct route and the subsequent destruction of a 
primarily African-American neighborhood. 
12  Fein 2008,  4; 167
ARTERIAL DEVELOPMENT AND SLUM 
CLEARANCE
While the Federal Aid Highway Act provided much of the 
funding needed for the through-highways, the city still 
needed to provide the funding for local street improvements 
Showing separation of the artery from adjacent residential 
property by means of buffer strips. Residents have access to 
local streets only.
The former through-street becomes a local street severing 
the shopping center. A service street with off-street parking at 
the rear of shopping center is completely separated from the 
artery by a buffer strip. Another buffer strip protects the rear or 
residential properties which face on another street.
Showing center division strip and buffer strips separating artery 
from traffic on local and service street.
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and re-routings. Federal funding available through early 
urban renewal programs provided a potential source of 
funding.  Concurrently with the highway planning, Syracuse 
was investigating how to manage blight in East Syracuse. 
East Syracuse, or Ward 17, was a primarily African-American 
working-class neighborhood. According to the 1950 Census, 
51.8% of the dwelling units in the area were dilapidated 
and 34.2%  had no running water.13 This area was a prime 
target for blight eradication through urban renewal. By 
marrying the two projects ‒ highway construction and slum 
clearance, later called urban renewal ‒ Syracuse was able to 
use urban renewal funding to raze a blighted area, while at 
the same time securing federal highway funding to build the 
state-supported I-81 viaduct. Figure 4 shows the site of the 
proposed slum clearance project and the eventual route of 
the raised viaduct.
 City leaders answered stakeholders’ requests for downtown 
highway circulation without putting the city into debt by 
holding up the state engineers’ conclusion that a viaduct was 
the best technical and fiscal solution. The execution of this 
plan literally and figuratively bulldozed over any opposition. 
Construction on the viaduct began in 1958. Nelson Pitts, the 
same engineer who raised concerns about the effectiveness 
of highways in supporting a healthy downtown now 
raised questions about the equity of the viaduct plan. He 
estimated that the highway system would displace over 
1,400 households throughout the area.14 City officials used 
the 1950 Census data to argue that property values in the 
area were already so low that the viaduct could not possibly 
further damage the area. State engineers glazed over 
concerns about the community of East Syracuse. The plan 
promised to produce an artfully constructed highway that 
would connect the community to Syracuse’s downtown and 
waterfront. Yet almost immediately upon completion, the 
Syracuse Post-Standard declared the elevated highway an 
“eye-sore” and a mistake.15
VIADUCT BACKLASH
Through the 1950s and 1960s, heavy-handed bureaucrats 
defined the decision-making process, and extensive 
public input was not considered a viable option. However, 
Syracuse quickly realized that the viaduct was a technical, 
social, and economic failure. Technically, the viaduct’s 
narrow lanes and reverse S-curve pattern make its stretch 
of the highway treacherous for drivers. This, coupled with 
13  DiMento 2009
14  DiMento 2009, 148 
15  Onondaga Citizens’ League 2008
the lack of a shoulder to allow the passage of emergency 
vehicles, means that the viaduct is not only difficult to reach 
in case of emergency, it is also quickly jammed by even 
minor occurrences. 
Syracuse now faces the dual problem of a rapidly 
deteriorating viaduct and an economically depressed 
downtown. Economically, the downtown highways were 
not the civic panacea  the city hoped they would be. As 
Pitts predicted, the highway carried people away from and 
through the center of the city, but rarely to it. The social 
failure of the viaduct has left southeast Syracuse cut off 
from neighboring communities. The area remains desolate 
as development under the viaduct area is undesirable and 
impossible to finance.  Unfortunately, over the past 20 
years while downtown fell behind and the highway systems 
crumbled, city leaders poured hundreds of millions of dollars 
into a mega-mall project built on the shore of Onondaga 
Lake, two miles from the city center. The retail expansion 
of the mall continues to prevent businesses from investing 
in stand-alone stores in downtown Syracuse and draws 
people away from the city center into corporate enclaves 
for everything from shopping and dining to celebrations and 
receptions.
PARTICIPATORY PLANNING TODAY
Today, Syracuse is keener to incorporate public input into the 
planning process. In an effort to reach out to the community 
on how to address the crumbling viaduct, the Syracuse 
Metropolitan Transportation Council (SMTC) is working 
with local organizations to gather community opinions 
on the wide range of options. The Syracuse Metropolitan 
Transportation Council is the State-designated Metropolitan 
Planning Organization (MPO), responsible for administering 
the continuous and comprehensive transportation planning 
process in Syracuse and the surrounding area.  The Governor 
of New York established the SMTC and similar SMOs in 1966 
to oversee the long-range transportation plans for state 
and individual cities. According to Nell Donaldson, a Senior 
Transportation Planner at the council, the new form of 
community-based urban planning is clearly part of SMTC’s 
agenda. 
SMTC is one of the two major actors behind the I-81 
Challenge, a local and regional effort to gather input on the 
future plans for the regional highway system. Online, the 
I-81 Challenge provides visitors a wide range of information 
on the history of the highway system, current challenges, 
and potential options for the future. The case study section 
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Figure 4. Urban Renewal Zone: Note: Almond Ave at the eastern border,  along the eventual route of the elevated viaduct.
Source: Jerome Allan Cohn, “Urban Background to the Interstate Highway Program: The Planning and Politics of Highways in Syracuse: 
1944–1960” (PhD thesis, Syracuse University, 1978).pg. 202A
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provides the reader with 19 studies of how cities across the 
United States are managing similar highway challenges. 
Interestingly, while SMTC is leading the community outreach 
and focus group meetings, much of the engineering 
and technical analysis is in the hands of the second 
organizational actor, the New York State Department of 
Transportation (NYSDOT). Given the contentious history of 
NYSDOT in Syracuse, the two agencies decided it would be 
more effective for NYSDOT to remain a shadow actor, while 
SMTC plays the leading role during the initial community 
outreach phases.16 
The galvanizing question regarding Syracuse’s highway 
system is the viaduct. Although I-81 as a whole needs 
upgrades, the 1.4-mile stretch of elevated highway is 
rapidly deteriorating.  One possible option is to lower the 
viaduct to street level. This solution would be similar to 
action taken by the city of Milwaukee in the 1990s to lower 
the Park East Freeway. In the case of Milwaukee’s freeway, 
the challenges were similar: the elevated highway cut into 
the city’s downtown, and the communities bordering the 
highway suffered from economic depression and were cut 
off from their adjoining neighborhoods. However, there 
are dramatic differences between the two projects. The 
major difference is that the Park East Freeway was a spur 
connecting downtown Milwaukee to Interstate 43, whereas 
the viaduct in Syracuse is the interstate itself.17 
The I-81 Challenge goes beyond just revitalizing downtown 
Syracuse. The decisions made about the future of I-81 
affect regional traffic patterns. The city’s highway system 
is a linchpin in north-south and east-west traffic at the 
city, regional, and state levels. The solution that Syracuse 
eventually identifies for the failing viaduct cannot only 
serve residents of the immediate area. As Ms. Donaldson 
said, “Whatever the solution, it must distribute burdens and 
benefits equally to all users, both intra-city and inter-city.”18 
SMTC recently announced that, following the completion 
of focus group studies, engineering analysis, and outside 
research, a potential plan will be released for public review 
in 2017. SMTC notes that this plan will not be a final decision, 
but a roadmap for how the city may proceed.
According to Syracuse’s City Council, funding for the project 
cannot come from the municipality. This leaves the City 
dependent on federal and state aid for the vast amount of 
16  Donaldson 2011
17  SMTC 2010, 12
18  Donaldson 2011
project capital costs.19 At the same time as the I-81 Challenge 
program, NYSDOT  is developing plans for traffic from I-81 to 
efficiently circulate through the area.  The recommendations 
from NYSDOT engineers   may be complementary to the 
goals of the City of Syracuse and downtown residents, or it 
may not. NYSDOT’s reputation as a technocratic body, that 
delivers top down solutions, makes both city leadership 
and residents wary of the State’s plan for efficiency. Lastly, 
there is the federal position. Under President Eisenhower in 
the 1960s, the administration saw infrastructure planning 
as the function of civil engineers and technical workers. 
The Eisenhower administration articulated top-down 
transportation and planning strategies that did not give 
consideration to the social science of city planning or long-
term social effects of urban renewal. In today’s political 
climate, it is impossible to say what infrastructure doctrine 
will be flowing out of Washington in five to ten years. 
Formerly public services, including infrastructure provision 
continue to shift toward the private domain, It is possible 
within the next decade that reconstructing highways will 
rely on a private investors, rather than government funding. 
Although the philosophies of infrastructure and planning 
have evolved, the economic bottom line is still in place. 
SMTC and NYSDOT may seek the economic, environmental, 
and equitable solution for Syracuse, but that triple bottom 
line is destined to dissolve into one, which is the same as it 
has ever been: What will it cost and who is willing to pay?
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